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Conceptual frameworks of accounting: some
brief reﬂections on theory and practice
Richard Macve, LSE*
Two very different approaches to evaluating con-
ceptual frameworks (CFs) for accounting are set out
by Christensen (2010) and Boyle (2010).1
Christensen reviews a body of research, primarily
theoretical and based on ‘information economics’,
which has explored the potential role and ‘com-
parative advantage’ of standardised, audited ﬁnan-
cial statements in a setting where shareholders and
managers (formally characterised as ‘principals’ and
‘agents’) are making investment decisions and are
implementing performance-based compensation
contracts. To make the link to published reports as
the primary focus of standard-setters’ CFs and to
stock exchange investors, Christensen explores
these problems within a competitive market setting
(formally characterised as ‘efﬁcient’) where mul-
tiple information sources are utilised by multiple
information intermediaries, such as analysts and
ﬁnancial journalists, as well as by investors them-
selves. The major insights from his review are that
two distinct functions of accounting, namely, pro-
viding useful information for investment decisions
and providing control information for monitoring
and rewarding managers’ performance, are demon-
strated ideally to require different kinds of account-
ing measures (in particular with differing degrees of
relevance and reliability). ‘Moral hazard’ results
from managers having ‘proprietary information’
about the ﬁrm, i.e. knowing things that owners and
other outsiders do not know unless the managers tell
them, and therefore being able to hide the full story
if they choose to act opportunistically in their own
rather than owners’ best interests. Even if separate
accounting bases were employed for each of the
distinct functions, the moral hazard means that
inevitably the two kinds of reporting ‘infect’ each
other. The outcome is that setting just one satisfac-
tory body of accounting standards that has to cover
both will be extremely problematic, given man-
agers’ own incentives. Moreover, setting rules that
will be the same for all companies inevitably loses
the particular balance of characteristics of informa-
tion requirements that would be optimal for each
individual ﬁrm, and there has to be a political
decision as to who will beneﬁt and who will lose.
Furthermore, by the time published, audited,
accounting reports appear, it is likely that there will
be little ‘news’ in them. That conclusion has been
supported by empirical evidence since Ball &
Brown’s famous 1968 paper. However, this does
not mean the accounting reports have no value.
Managers know that after the end of the year they
will have to release the audited accounts to their
shareholders and other investors. This will itself
constrain the information released during the year to
be as consistent as possible. Their actions are also
constrained by the information they know will
eventually be reported. Hence accounting informa-
tion plays a role in controlling agency costs.
Christensen therefore argues that the qualitative
characteristics (QCs) that are a feature of all the
frameworks to date (both national and international)
are too crude to help in calibrating the actual trade-
offs that need to be made. The same can be said of
the high level deﬁnitions of ‘elements of ﬁnancial
statements’ and, one might add, the ‘recognition
criteria’. Moreover, from an information perspec-
tive, there is no inherent superiority in any one basis
of measurement: choices should be made of ‘horses
for courses’ in individual standards and therefore
there is little value in including measurement in the
CF. Christensen’s conclusion, arguing as he has
from ‘the bottom up’, is that this leaves only the
highest level of the CF as potentially fulﬁlling a
useful role, in setting out what he calls a
‘Constitution’.2 By this he means the broad object-
ives that the standard-setters will pursue, and
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principles they will observe, in writing rules for
every major company around the world to follow.
Boyle, by contrast approaches the issue more
from the ‘top down’ perspective of a regulator and
ﬁnds it hard to relate the context of Christensen’s
‘bottom up’ world of ‘primitive’ ﬁrms to his arena.
Here the accounting rules of IASB and FASB are
primarily for large, listed companies, with boards of
directors and hierarchies of management reporting
publicly to widely dispersed shareholders.
Alongside the ﬁnancial institutions there are pas-
sive, small investors for whose protection much of
the regulation has been designed. The insights from
‘agency’ models seem difﬁcult to scale up to such a
multiperson world – but cf. ICAEW (2005). The
‘efﬁciency’ of unfettered markets in providing full
information ﬂows to all parties is questionable (as
the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 has reminded
everyone), and regulation is needed because even
non-speculative investors, who need to balance
their investment portfolios, want to know that
individual ﬁrms’ risks are fully and fairly reﬂected
in their market prices. If the public, through the
government, are to give standard-setters, such as
IASB, the power to set mandatory standards then
they need to be assured of their independence, their
balanced representativeness, and above all their
intellectual credibility and technical competence.
The constitutional relationships between the IASC
Foundation and the IASB (and, in the EU, the
requirement for endorsement prior to adoption of
new standards) are designed to cover the ﬁrst two of
these concerns. It is in respect of the third that the
CF has its own important role.
Arguments for and against regulation per se and
over how costs and beneﬁts of alternative account-
ing rules are to be assessed are covered in the papers
by Bushman & Landsman (2010) and by Schipper
(2010) presented in the conference to which
Christensen contributed. Leuz (2010) explores the
importance of the national and institutional contexts
in shaping accepted and acceptable forms of
accounting; and Moran (2010) reminds us that the
delegation of powers to non-government bodies is
itself a political decision, and the balance between
the two may emerge differently at different times
and in different political jurisdictions, so that
international regulation introduces a yet higher
level of complexity.
Here I will pursue Boyle’s argument that the CF
is needed to demonstrate the technical credentials of
the IASB (or FASB). New IASB Board members
have to sign up to the CF. Boyle appears to think
that it is the current type of CF that is needed.
Consequently, as he asserts, deﬁnitions of elements
such as ‘assets’ are a required part of the CF to
ensure as much consistency as possible across time
(not least as Board members change). These
arguments have had a long currency, ever since
FASB began its CF project in 1974 (Macve, 1981).
However, we should note that in Boyle’s ‘real
world’, what is recognised in accounting as an asset
(and correspondingly as a liability) and how it is
measured frequently changes as standards change.
Consider for example: the current proposals on
leases; recent US recognition of ‘in process research
and development’ at acquisition date as a continuing
asset in its standard on business combinations;
removal of ‘acquisition costs’ in business combin-
ations and (proposed) in life insurance accounting;
pension liabilities; and proposals to change IAS 37
in respect of what used to be called ‘contingent
liabilities’. Assets may be treated inconsistently
within current standards, e.g. ‘acquired’ and ‘intern-
ally developed’ intangibles such as brands and
goodwill; a new subsidiary’s assets at the date of
acquisition (including intangibles) identiﬁed and
measured at ‘fair value’ while the holding com-
pany’s equivalent assets remain unrecognised or
valued at (depreciated) historical cost. Other
changes in the reporting of income have not even
resulted from recognising net asset changes.
Consider for example the expensing of executive
stock options (Bromwich et al., 2010) or the latest
proposals on ‘revenue recognition’ (Macve, 2010).
It has long been argued that seeking such higher-
level deﬁnitions, and believing that the levels of the
CF must form a deductive logical sequence con-
cluding with clear, consistent ‘high quality’ stand-
ards, represents a serious failure to understand the
insights of the modern philosophy of language
(e.g. Kitchen, 1954; Macve, 1981; Sunder, 2007;
Dennis 2006, 2008).
Christensen also analyses rigorously the role of
QCs and demonstrates why it has long been argued
that they are little more than common sense ‘rules of
thumb’ and do not deserve the repeated reshufﬂings
of their meanings and rankings that have occupied
much space in successive versions of the CF
(e.g. Chambers, 1964; Macve, 1981). CFs have
also thus far stumbled over the crucial measurement
stage. One honourable exception is the UK ASB’s
(1999) Statement of Principles which, while retain-
ing advocacy of a ‘mixed measurement model’,
argued that current values should be ‘deprival
values’ (see, e.g. Lennard, 2010; Macve, 2010 and
Whittington, 2010).
In comparing Christensen’s and Boyle’s
approaches we may note that Christensen’s litera-
ture citations largely reﬂect US sources. Here I
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reﬂect brieﬂy on how far UK literature has
supported his approach vis à vis Boyle’s. The
‘information economics’ approach to analysing
accounting problems and voluntary disclosure is
clearly set out in leading textbooks such as
Bromwich (1992), which also covers the economic
arguments in favour of regulating the mandatory
provision of accounting information (including
problems of ‘public goods’ and cost structures of
disclosure), and the conceptual difﬁculties in
deriving an unambiguous, practical notion of
‘income’.
A major feature of current CFs is their ultimate
focus on measuring income (and potentially com-
ponents of income such as ‘earnings’), even though
they argue this is to be achieved through the
‘balance sheet’ approach of focusing on the recog-
nition and measurement of assets and liabilities and
of changes in them. Christensen notes that it is well
known that the measurement of ‘income’ in the
economist’s sense of the change in wealth, or of the
‘permanent income’, is not achievable except in
conditions where the knowledge would be redun-
dant, so settling the deﬁnitions and measurement
bases cannot achieve that goal (for fuller recent
expositions of the reasons for this see,
e.g. Bromwich et al., 2010 and Whittington,
2010). As the FASB’s original CF project (and its
subsequent imitations by, e.g. ASB, IASC and now
IASB) can indeed be viewed as the culmination of a
‘search for accounting principles’ imposed on the
accounting profession in the US in the 1930s at the
instigation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) (e.g. Macve, 1983; cf. Zeff,
1999), it has so far remained part and parcel of the
search for the ‘best’ deﬁnition of proﬁt/income to
replace what is seen as the untidy and incoherent
tangle of assorted, historically evolved, ‘conven-
tions’ that appear to lack conceptual justiﬁcation
(e.g. Chambers, 1964; FASB/IASB, 2005).
Even in the 1930s there was a ‘British’ voice in
the US. George O. May of Price Waterhouse argued
that better disclosure of information and of account-
ing choices was what was needed, rather than the
attempted speciﬁcation of detailed uniform
accounting rules (e.g. Macve, 1983: 178–179).
Perhaps May’s position was undermined by the
almost complete lack of explanation of what
accounting policies were being used by UK com-
panies at that time. That situation lasted until the
advent of UK accounting standards in the 1970s
(Zeff, 2009) and in particular the UK standard
SSAP 2 Disclosure of Accounting Policies (ASC,
1972).
There remains an urgent need for a fundamental
rethink of what ‘kind of thing’ a CF for accounting
should be (Power, 1992). It should probably follow
Christensen’s advice and stay at the ‘top level’. It
might focus, for example, on setting out the key
factors and questions that the standard-setters
would address and their approach to the trade-offs
they would have to make (e.g. Macve, 1981). It
could set out the need for ‘practical reasoning’ based
on ‘bottom up’ investigation and understanding of
current practices, evaluation of their continuing
practical value (alongside their conceptual justiﬁ-
cation), and deliberation and consultation on poten-
tial for improvement. That could be more beneﬁcial
than attempting ‘top down’ logical deduction of
‘correct’ standards that the current kind of ‘ofﬁcial’
CF has conspicuously failed to deliver over the 35-
plus years of its very expensive development (e.g.
Dopuch and Sunder, 1980; Macve, 1997; Dennis,
2006, 2008). In a recent initiative, the members of
the Financial Accounting Standards Committee of
the American Accounting Association (Bloomﬁeld
et al., 2009) critique the extant frameworks and the
IASB/FASB convergence of frameworks, offering
instead a framework that meets their own preferred
criteria. Their alternative adopts primarily an
income statement approach rather than the FASB/
IASB balance sheet approach.
We should not be surprised if such alternative
kinds of CF lead to piecemeal, evolutionary
improvements in accounting practice and disclo-
sures rather than wholesale replacement by a new,
much more logically consistent ‘accounting model’
(ICAEW, 2009). An interesting comparison is the
standard QWERTY keyboard.3 It is inefﬁcient, but
universal (outside specialist typing competitions).
An efﬁcient keyboard would, from the beginning,
have been centred according to the relative fre-
quency of the use of the individual letters in writing
the English language. However, it is widely
believed that because this would have caused the
original ‘hammer’ typewriters to jam, they had to be
‘slowed down’ by spacing out the most frequent
characters. To help the marketing of the new
mechanical writing machine, Remington, so the
widespread belief goes, designed the top row so that
it contains all the letters of ‘typewriter’ (plus Q, U
and O for camouﬂage), which is the word the sales
force would use in demonstrating the machine’s
superior speed. The trade-off between speed and
mechanical efﬁciency was historically contingent
on conditions at that time. Now the QWERTY
keyboard is so embedded that we are still using it for
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 15 ABR Macve Comment.3d Page 305 of 308
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electronic machines, even though the most efﬁcient
layout to achieve maximum speed is now known for
each language. QWERTY seems likely to remain
until keyboards themselves are obsolete.
Does the same apply, e.g. to ‘relevance’ and
‘reliability’ of accounting numbers, given changing
relative costs in different places at different times?
The accounting model we have is the outcome of
many such past trade-offs (Basu and Waymire,
2008). It is now so embedded in many spheres that it
is not clear that, even if accounting theory could set
out a CF for a ‘best’ model, we would ﬁnd it
worthwhile to adopt it, given the costs of transition.
‘Fixing what’s broke’ may continue to be sufﬁcient
(e.g. ICAEW, 2009), especially if this is comple-
mented by empowering users (e.g. through internet
‘drilling down’ to ﬁner information levels) to tailor
the accounting to their own needs so that they are
not constrained by the straight jacket of the
‘standard model’ and can again become more like
the freely-contracting actors in Christensen’s scen-
ario.
An alternative approach to retaining desirable
ﬂexibility, this time perhaps more to suit preparers’
differing situations while providing a standard
‘benchmark’, is the option to ‘comply or explain’
familiar in the UK from the Combined Code of
Corporate Governance (FRC, 2008: Preamble). Or
again, relevant groups of preparers, e.g. large
multinationals (a ‘global players segment’) as
suggested by Leuz (2010), could be allowed to
use models of a kind more suited to their own
complexity (as they can, for example, in adopting
the Global Reporting Initiative or other voluntary
codes for sustainability management and reporting
(Chen & Macve, 2010). Alternatively specialist
industry groups might build their own supplemen-
tary models to supply more useful information than
their IFRS accounts, as European insurers have
done with ‘Embedded Value’ reporting for life
insurance accounting (Horton et al., 2007).The
advent in recent years of the opportunity for
shareholders to vote on the Directors’
Remuneration Report (e.g. in the UK and
Australia)4 also increases the interaction between
the users, preparers and auditors of published
accounts.
Some concluding reﬂections
Christensen’s analysis sets out some of the formal
demonstrations that researchers have worked on
that bear out older, more intuitive arguments that
there can be no ideal practical measure of income.
Income measurement always involves estimation of
the future (Edey, 1970). The demands of investor
decision-making and control (and other contractual
relationships) generally require different kinds of
accounting (Edey, 1978). Accordingly, standard-
setting is inevitably dealing with compromises and
trade-offs, albeit in a world where little is known
about the effects of these and their costs and beneﬁts
(Schipper, 2010; cf. Gwilliam et al., 2005). Difﬁcult
judgments must be made.
However, in viewing the existence of audit as
implying that accounting data are ‘hard to manipu-
late’, Christiansen’s characterisation seems over
simpliﬁed. Arguably, it is not in the routine
veriﬁcation of ‘hard’ data, but rather in ‘guarantee-
ing’ that investors and others can trust the relatively
‘soft’ estimates and judgments underlying the
accounting (based on the auditors’ wide knowledge
and experience of many companies, coupled with
their close contact with the audit client’s manage-
ment), that auditors can be seen as ‘adding value’
(Grout et al., 1994); while Power (1996) argues that
much of what is ‘veriﬁable’ by audit is not ‘given’ as
hard data but is socially constructed to be
‘auditable’.
Accounting reporting and disclosure also have an
important role beyond that of providing information
for managers and individual investors in individual
ﬁrms, or even when comparing ﬁrms. Standardised,
audited accounts are part of a regime that deﬁnes the
economic environment in a country, or across
countries, and enables investors to have conﬁdence
in the system as a whole as one to which to entrust
their money. This was the main justiﬁcation given
by Edwards (1938) in his call for a revolutionary
reform of UK accounting practice. It seems as true
today. In the view of the US SEC it is the overall
regime of standards of corporate governance,
accounting, auditing and enforcement in a country
that lowers the cost of capital to ﬁrms in that
economy and thereby stimulates investment and
economic growth. This effect is probably greater
than what any individual ﬁrm can achieve by
improving its own accounting and disclosures (cf.
Botosan, 2006).
In other words, the ﬁrms etc., in Section 2 of
Christensen’s analysis are ‘given’ (exogenous to the
argument). But equally one can argue that ﬁrms are
‘endogenous’, i.e. partly created by the availability
of good accounting and an appropriate regulatory
regime. That is Boyle’s concern, and has been the
concern of UK Company Law, not only in the
Company Law Review from 1999 to 2005, but ever
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 15 ABR Macve Comment.3d Page 306 of 308
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since the 19th century invention of ‘limited liability’
(Edey & Panitpakdi, 1978). It is interesting that
such endogeneity is not currently admitted by the
IASB, which takes the view that the stability of the
current ﬁnancial system is not a matter on which the
standard-setter should be concerned.
There are mutually reinforcing insights to be
gained from both ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’
approaches. There will always be a creative tension
between rigorous, abstract theoretical research and
the current imperatives of practical and policy
concerns. It is ironic that Boyle concludes by
disparaging the kind of work outlined by
Christensen when he begins his response by quoting
Keynes’s famous dictum, made when he was
defending his own ‘wild’ theories against the
objections of the ‘practical men’ of his day.
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